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The First Step to a Nation? The Irish postal service and the Home Rule Crisis. 
In early 1911, a year before the introduction of the third Home Rule Bill, an 
article appeared in An Claidheamh Soluis, the journal of the Irish cultural-
nationalist language movement, the Gaelic League, demanding the inclusion in 
the bill of Irish control of the Post Office. It detailed how the Post Office had 
become part of the life of Ireland with ‘branches in every town and every 
village almost of the land….Its officials translate our most private business, and 
its messengers come daily to the doors of all.’1 Claiming that an English Post 
Office was an ‘insuperable obstacle to the use of the Irish language in public 
business, with its examinations being an obstacle to educational reform’, it 
demanded that any legislation must include control of this very important 
institution.2 
On 24 April 1916, separatist rebels seized the General Post Office to 
proclaim the establishment of an Irish Republic. The Home Rule Bill had been 
subverted. While it has been argued that the GPO is central to all accounts of 
the Easter Rising of 1916,3 questions remain about the role of the Post Office in 
the Irish revolution. It has been suggested that ’we have no idea what appeal 
[the GPO] possessed’ and although it was ‘an impressive stage for the political 
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drama’4 this had no strategic significance.5 Conversely, this article argues that 
the symbolism of choosing the GPO was profound. The ‘richly symbolic 
significance’ of storming the GPO in 1916 is unmistakeable.6   The Post Office in 
Ireland had entrenched the British state in the lives of ordinary Irish people and 
the GPO represented the physical manifestation of this. Nationalists fully 
understood the importance of gaining control of such an institution. This paper 
reassesses the proposition contained in the original Third Home Bill of 1912 to 
grant control of the Post Office to the Irish government.  A reading of the 
debates on this aspect of the bill, at a parliamentary and popular level, and the 
ultimate fate of the provision, reveals wider concerns about the nature of the 
Home Rule settlement; threats to imperial authority, status, security and 
financial interests and the question of Ulster. It also illuminates whether anyone 
genuinely believed a significant Home Rule would be granted. The hopes of 
many nationalists for the ill-fated third Home Rule bill were high, but the 
chances of the bill ever passing in its original form were exiguous. Home Rule, 
which involved the granting of some form of devolved government to Ireland, 
had been on the agenda since 1885. Although given Royal assent in 1914, the 
Act was suspended for the duration of the war, and was surpassed eventually 
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by the Government of Ireland Act 1920. While the historiography of Home Rule 
is extensive, it has focused primarily on the Ulster question and the role of the 
Liberals. Few scholars have touched on the Post Office and then primarily in 
relation to the financial aspects of the bill and the appointment of personnel.7 
Yet the ideal of establishing a separate Irish Post Office reveals much about the 
debate concerning the future of the government of Ireland.  
The fate of the Post Office in Ireland reflected the fate of the country. 
That the Home Rule Act of 1914 never came into operation opened up 
possibilities for alternative action, and that rebels chose the GPO as the site to 
announce the establishment of an Irish republic was highly significant. 
Following the partition of Ireland by the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, the 
Post Office was split.8 The newly formed states both used the Post Office to 
project their ideals. While Alvin Jackson and Patrick Joyce touch on the Post 
Office during the Victorian period, the subject has largely been ignored by 
historians. 9 A recent reviewer of the work of Patrick Joyce wondered why he 
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did not conclude his book on post offices and freedom with the nationalists’ 
taking of the GPO in 1916.10    This paper rectifies this omission. 
 
         
II 
 
As Patrick Joyce and Martin Daunton have shown, the Post Office was a 
powerful institution and business, engaged in a wide range of activities on a 
political, cultural and economic level.11 Joyce has argued that the true life of the 
state was to be found in administration and that the Post Office was one of the 
main ‘places and spaces’ of power which demonstrated the tools, practices and 
rationales of governance.12  
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The Post Office in Ireland in 1912 was a symbol of British power. The 
expansion of Victorian bureaucracy meant that there were more Irish people in 
public employment and the physical expression of the state was of increasing 
importance within everyday life.13 As Alvin Jackson has noted, the Post Office 
exemplified this state intrusion into the Irish landscape. 14 Between 1800 and 
1920, the Post Office became a universal communications system.15 It was the 
main channel of communications across the Empire and employed thousands 
of civil servants who obtained their positions through a political patronage 
system.16 In 1911 of the 23,000 civil servants in Ireland, 20,000 were in the Post 
Office.17  
As an instrument of British policy the government was able to provide 
‘support for factions and classes it wished to foster and denied it to those it 
wished to weaken or render invisible’.18 The physical presence of the post 
offices in villages and towns, with post boxes bearing the royal insignia bought 
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people into contact with the British state in more ways. The trappings of 
Empire were reinforced by the paraphernalia of the Post Office (the colour red, 
insignia, stamps bearing the monarch’s head) and so it entered people’s lives in 
many ways.19 The Post Office administered old age pensions and the savings 
bank. Indeed it was argued that the Post Office had become a great carrying 
agent for British merchants and dealers in cheap goods ‘helping them in their 
competition with retail traders of Ireland, giving every facility for business 
transacted in English’.20 Ireland generated little revenue for the Post Office but 
was considered a vital strategic priority.21  There were repeated attempts to 
secure and maximise the speed and security of the postal connections between 
Britain and Ireland. 22  
On the eve of the introduction of the third Home Rule bill, there was a 
growing concern in Ireland that the impending bill would not mention the Post 
Office. Rumours abounded that while the government was prepared to concede 
control of the Post Office, nationalist leaders were unwilling to accept it because 
it was running at a considerable loss. Writing in March 1912 before the 
publication of the terms of the bill, Lord Anthony MacDonnell, the former 
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Under Secretary for Ireland from 1902 to 1908,23 argued against transferring the 
Postal Department to the new Government. Although Ireland had an 
‘indefeasible claim’, to the great bulk of the patronage within her shores, he did 
not think there was sufficient justification for an Irish post office which would 
incur ‘the risk of dislocating the working of a great Imperial Department’. 24  
Supporters of the transfer of the Post Office to the Irish government 
argued that if control of it was omitted from the bill, then it was a sham home 
rule. An editorial of the Irish Independent, in October 1911, declared that the fate 
of the ‘mainly nationalist’ 20,000 fellow employees, was ‘in the hands of a small 
group of Englishmen and ”loyalist” Irishmen at the head of the GPO, whose 
rule is so unpopular the whole of the Irish Post Office service is in a state of 
smouldering discontent’.25 There was widespread condemnation of the 
perceived increasing centralising control and exclusion of competent Irishmen 
from positions within the Post Office. The Nationalist press was concerned 
about what they termed the ‘dumping’ process, which involved filling 
vacancies with men from England. That this was being done while a Home 
Rule bill was imminent should ‘bring home to the Irish people the importance 
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of having the Post Office under Irish control.’26 In response to a rumour that the 
Post Office would be omitted from the bill, the staunchly Republican paper, the 
Enniscorthy Echo, argued omission implied that the Irish were unfit to be trusted 
with their post but ‘be at liberty to bear all the cost, provide the salaries but not 
have a voice in the appointment of a single official’.27 
The relationship between nationalist Ireland and the Post Office was 
antagonistic. Control over the Post Office had long been a nationalist ambition.  
The Gaelic League, ‘the nursery for the revolutionary generation of 1916’,28  
resented the ruling of the GPO in London that all mail in Ireland be addressed 
in English and saw the Post Office as a powerful Anglicising agency in Ireland. 
It has been argued that the extension of the postal system into the west of 
Ireland corresponded with the development of education and English.29 An 
Claidheamh Soluis, lamented that as ‘the social influence of the village postmaster 
was tremendous … against him the voice of the league was often lost like a 
voice in the wilderness.’30 The League also wanted Irish to be an optional 
subject for the Post Office examinations and demanded the appointment of 
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Irish-speaking postmasters in Irish-speaking areas. A bitter campaign to allow 
mail in Irish had started in 1900, which, if successful, threatened to undermine 
authority in the postal system.31 As bilingualism was not recognised in Ireland 
this would violate government policy.32 The Freeman’s Journal suggested Dublin 
Castle’s attitude was that any recognition of anything relating to Gaelicism 
would compromise its position.33  Nationalist MPs took up the cause and raised 
matters in parliament.34 The MP for Leitrim South warned the Postmaster 
General Austen Chamberlain that the Irish language movement was ‘a great 
and growing one and not to be trifled with’.35 Douglas Hyde, President of the 
Gaelic League, argued that the ‘GPO made Irish penal’ in the Post Office and 
that the battle for the mail-in-Irish campaign was part of a battle of ‘Irish 
manhood and self-respect’.36 By 1905, the Dublin GPO was receiving more than 
1200 letters addressed in Irish each day, and the Dublin postmaster had 
reassigned some clerks and telegraphists with knowledge of Irish to translate 
the addresses. Just prior to the League’s Language Week, a week-long festival 
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which celebrated the Irish language, it was receiving hundreds of packages 
which contained the announcements and paraphernalia for the event. The GPO 
refused to handle them and a public battle ensued. At the Language Week 
procession, which occurred at the height of this conflict, the Archbishop of 
Dublin, William Walsh, told the crowd he had attended the event primarily 
‘because of the attack made by the post office’37. He praised the Gaelic League 
for its work in attempting to ‘bring Ireland back to her proper place in the 
world’.38   
The battle between the GPO and the Gaelic League was carried out in 
the pages of An Claidheamh Soluis which claimed; ’The Gaelic League and the 
British state […] sees clearly, that an educated Irish speaking Ireland means, in 
the truest sense of the words, a free Ireland’.39 Letters to the editor complained 
vociferously about the penalising of Irish speakers by the GPO.40 In November 
1911, the central council of the Gaelic League resolved that under any scheme 
of Home Rule it was essential that the Post Office be placed under Irish control 
‘otherwise it will be a grave danger to the Irish language and Irish 
Nationality’.41 In the same year the Dungarvan branch of the Gaelic League 
                                                          
37




 An Claidheamh Soluis, 28 October 1905. 
40
 Ibid., 8 March  1913. 
41 The Times, 11 November 1911. 
11 
 
adopted a resolution requesting the appointment to the Post Office in 
Dungarvan, Co. Waterford, of a postmaster having knowledge of Irish.  It 
argued that over 20,000 postal packets passed through the Post Office each year 
and were often delayed, and that members of the branch were expected to 
assist postal authorities in translating names and addresses. In 1912, the newly 
appointed English-born  Secretary of the Post Office, Arthur Norway, despite 
being ‘quite in sympathy with the Irish language movement as an evidence of 
patriotic feeling or as a literary pursuit,’ considered it unnecessary to insist 
upon a knowledge of Irish as a condition for appointment. He thought it would 
only encourage ‘other similar applications from other quarters’ and would 
cause ‘a good deal of unnecessary trouble’.42 It was decided that the 
advertisement would not call for Irish speakers as the ‘more suitable candidate 
would not apply’.43 Sinn Féin Weekly pointed out in response that ‘nearly 40 per 
cent of the people of the town of Dungarvan speak Irish and two out of every 
three persons in the surrounding country are Irish speakers’ and suggested the 
PMG would not attempt to do a similar thing in Wales.44  
The appointment of Norway stimulated a chorus of complaints in the 
nationalist press and political circles. It was expected that James Mac Mahon, 
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the assistant secretary of the GPO and a Catholic, would be given the job. 45  
The dissident Nationalist MP Tim Healy saw it as a sign that the Liberals did 
not believe home rule would become law.46 It was as a ‘conspiracy that made a 
mockery of Home Rule.’47 The Archdeacon of Armagh, Monsignor Patrick 
Segrave of Drogheda, declared it ‘an insult’ and ‘particularly hurtful at the 
present moment’ in light of Home Rule.48 Sinn Féin Weekly argued Ulster 
Unionists would be stupid if they did not ‘see in the appointment a stronger 
anti-Home Rule argument than any it has yet been able to forge. The 
appointment was a declaration of Irish incapacity for administrative 
government’.49 
Other nationalist groups demanded control over the Post Office. D.P. 
Moran’s nationalist journal Leader, which championed control over the Post 
Office, denounced Norway’s appointment ‘as an insult to Ireland’.50 Arguing 
that the Irish Post Office had for generations been ruled ‘by unsympathetic 
Englishmen who have never gained the confidence of the people or the respect 
of the staff,’ Moran complained ‘for too long we have been putting up with the 
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tap of the Orange drum’.51 Norway’s appointment, he suggested, provided 
nationalists with an opportunity to show that Ireland is determined to ‘fight her 
corner’.52 He argued that unless the Irish party responded there would a loss of 
confidence in the ‘ability and grit of the party.’ With acute prescience, he asked:  
‘who’s to say the government won’t cheat them over Home Rule in the 
details?’53  
The Leader denounced discrimination against Catholics in employment 
and saw the Post Office as a hotbed of recruitment for Freemasonry. It decried 
any appointments made to non-Catholics, or men ‘dumped from England’.54 
Moran’s editorial condemned the transfer of control of the Dublin Stores branch 
to London, challenging the Irish parliamentary party to do something.55 The 
Leader saw all these changes as part of a Unionist plot for which the Liberal 
government was responsible, as they were ‘calculated to place extra difficulties 
in the way when the Post Office in Ireland comes to be placed under a Home 
Rule government’.56    
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The radical separatist political movement, Sinn Féin, also called for 
control of the Post Office in its mouthpiece Sinn Féin Weekly.  In 1907 Sinn Féin 
issued a stamp which it claimed stood for ‘the right of the Irish people to have 
their own Post office’. 57 It issued propaganda labels bearing images reflecting 
very distinct Irish themes such as the harp, Irish wolfhound and shields of the 
four provinces of Ireland. Thomas Esmonde MP, who had split briefly from the 
IPP to join Sinn Fein and who designed the first propaganda label, suggested he 
would only reply to letters bearing the stamp.58 He was well aware of the 
dilemma posed by his former colleague, Nationalist MP Tom Kettle who wrote, 
acerbically, that Sinn Fein would ‘undergo corruption once more when it sticks 
on its letter a stamp with the superscription of an English king’.59 The PMG 
later issued regulations preventing the use of the stamp on the address side of 
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The third Home Rule Bill was far from satisfactory for all sides. It offered 
a modest measure of self-government, not as thorough as Gladstone’s 
recommendations. Nationalists, under the leadership of John Redmond, were 
dissatisfied with the financial provisions but pragmatic about them,62 and 
British and Irish unionists were unhappy that it gave too much. The radical 
nationalist group Sinn Féin denounced it. The unionist Irish Times declared 
there was a widespread ‘lack of interest in the bill, that ‘honest nationalists, if 
not hostile in their criticism, are lukewarm in their general approval, while 
Unionist businessmen openly condemn it as political trickery’.63 Initial debates 
on the bill concerned the financial aspects, described by contemporary 
politicians as presenting the likely major difficulty.64 With the financial 
                                                          
62
 P. Jalland, ‘Irish home-rule finance: a neglected dimension of the Irish question, 1910-14,’ Irish 
Historical Studies, 23/91 (1983) pp. 233-4. 
63
 Irish Times, 15 April 1912. 
64 Jalland, ‘Irish home-rule finance’, pp. 233-4; Parliamentary Archives (PA) SAM A/41’Irish 
Finance Present Position and outline of Proposals’ 
16 
 
settlement dependent on a unitary state, a compromise on Ulster would have 
meant complete readjustment of the financial settlement.65 
The financial scheme of the bill was complex.66 Under the new scheme 
while the Irish parliament was denied full responsibility for Irish finance, it 
gained control over some Post Office revenue. This excluded the Post Office 
Savings Bank, which remained one of the reserved services and would not be 
transferred until well after the Irish government had been established.67 
Administrative control of the Post Office was transferred to the Irish 
government. Nationalists were pleased that this meant control over about 
25,000 Irish civil servants.68 The Irish government would be able to alter certain 
stamps, stamps on bills of exchange and contracts. An advisory committee on 
Irish finance, led by Henry Primrose, found that while there had been a 
decrease in population there was an increase of nearly seventy-four per cent in 
fifteen years in the cost of running the Post Office and concluded that much of 
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the rising cost was due to the unified system of administration.69 Herbert 
Samuel, the Postmaster-General, who was in charge of drafting the financial 
provisions of the bill, later rejected the Primrose committee’s recommendations 
for Irish financial independence, but concurred with its findings regarding the 
Post Office. As the financial burden on the postal system had increased to more 
than 250,000 pounds, he argued the Home Rule Bill aimed to ‘throw upon the 
Irish people, the responsibility of regulating the Post Office’.70  
The initial objection to the inclusion of the Post Office in transfer of 
powers to an Irish parliament was part of general criticism of what was seen as 
the anti-imperial nature of the bill and the effects it would have on the north 
east.  Ulster Unionists’ strongly opposed the bill and plans to establish a 
provisional government had begun in September 1911.71 In his maiden speech 
in the House of Commons Belfast-born Liberal Unionist MP for Cambridge 
University, Joseph Larmor, asked a Dublin controlled post office would protect 
the commercial interests of the north of Ireland. Arguing that the reason for the 
increased costs of the Post Office in Ireland was due to the south and west of 
Ireland he claimed that the nationalists have been able to bring pressure on the 
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government for their own purposes.72  Conservative MP Donald Macmaster 
argued it would put into the hands of the Irish government an enormous power 
should they wish to use it in event of conflict between it and the Ulster people, 
and asked ‘is this a preparation for that conflict’?73 Underlining Ulster 
Unionists’ fervent opposition to Home Rule, and the threat that they would not 
pay taxes to an Irish parliament, he asked whether they would now be 
compelled to buy Irish stamps.74 Liberal MP Robert Harcourt mocked that the 
battle cry of 1912 was ‘No disintegration of the Post Office.’75 Following the 
initial debates, The Times predicted ‘from the Unionist side, with much 
sympathy from the Radicals, an attack on the surrender of the Post Office in 
Ireland’.76  
On 17 October 1912, as the Commons sat to debate the legislative powers 
of the Irish government, Scottish unionist MP John Stewart Murray, the 
Marquis of Tullibardine, proposed an amendment to reserve the Post Office to 
the Imperial parliament.  This led to a very long debate from which it is clear 
that the main objections to transfer of the Post Office to an Irish government 
reflected anxieties about Home Rule in general: threats to imperial authority 
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and status, national security, financial interests, the question of patronage and 
Ulster’s position.77  
One of the main charges levelled at the government for including the 
Post Office in the Home Rule Bill was that it was a shameless ploy to get Irish 
votes designed to fan separatist hopes. It has been suggested that British and 
Irish Unionists interpreted the Home Rule bill as an assault on Britain’s 
unwritten constitution.78 Austen Chamberlain argued that a separate Post 
Office was ‘a contravention of the settled principle of every Constitution in the 
British Empire’.79 Conceding such ‘universally regarded’ sovereign powers, 
would ‘fulfil the Nationalist idea’ of sovereignty by giving Ireland the 
appearance of sovereign power.80 It would encourage the Irish government to 
enforce further claims and eventually rid itself of any control by Westminster.81 
The Liberal Unionist Harry Lawson claimed this would give the Irish 
government an ‘opportunity for the exercise of the national fancy’. It would be 
                                                          
77
 HC Debates, 17 October 1912, vol. 42, col. 1491. 
78 D. Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands, 1912-39 (Oxford, 1998) p. 44. 
79 HC Debates, 17 October 1912, vol. 42, col. 1523. 
80
 HC Debates 17 October 1912, vol. 42, col. 1518-9. 
81
 HC Debates 17 October 1912, vol. 42, col. 1524. 
20 
 
able to ‘issue stamps and this could be interpreted as an indication of a 
National Government exercising national prerogatives’.82  
Unionist leader Edward Carson suggested the government was trying to 
satisfy the nationalists by supplying them with a national badge through the 
Post Office. He argued that those ‘great commercial people who hated the 
national badge’ would suffer great inconvenience if a separate post office was 
established in Ireland.83 He attacked the separatist doctrine that Ireland was run 
at a loss to England as part of the UK and challenged the postmaster general to 
go to the south and west of Ireland to tell home rulers that the main objective 
was to save the British exchequer and transfer the cost to Ireland.84 Drawing on 
an argument that lay at the heart of Ulster Unionist objections to Home Rule, 
Carson argued that separation would lead to economic hardship.  He accused 
nationalists of sacrificing prosperity for principles, arguing they preferred 
‘empty stomachs and rags’ to not having their ‘sentimental’ aspirations of 
nationality satiated. He objected to the imposition of this on those who did not 
share those aspirations.85  
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William Moore, MP for Armagh North, feared the provision would reduce 
the ‘mercantile industrial part of the country to a mere rural delivery.’86 He saw 
nothing in the bill preventing the Irish Parliament when it became ‘master of its 
own postal service’ from making its own postal rates, wondering what was to 
prevent the Irish Government from announcing England was a foreign 
country.87 Furthermore, he argued when the Irish parliament wanted to raise 
some revenue, it would extract it from Belfast:  
Why not get it out of the North? After all we are 75% engaged in 
agriculture, do not bother very much about writing letters, and we are not 
very much concerned about newspapers, but those wretched fellows in 
Belfast are writing letters, hundreds of them every day, and many of them 
to England. Let us put an extra half-penny on the fellow who writes to a 
foreign country. It will help to relieve our burden.88 
Colonial analogies, which were a prominent feature of the debates on 
Home Rule, were applied to the position and role of the Post Office89 and 
comparisons made with Australia, South Africa, and Canada, where separate 
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post offices were abolished after federation.90  One MP argued that the bill 
threatened to ‘put the clock back in this country, a clock which has been very 
much advanced under Liberal auspices in the Colonies’.91 The British and Irish 
postal systems, it was argued, were more interdependent than postal systems 
in the colonies.  
Arguably, the most controversial aspect of the possible transfer of the 
Post Office was the issue of patronage, with many objectors claiming it was the 
sole reason for the provision. Nationalists were concerned about the lack of 
control over patronage, and critics argued that Irish nationalists had always 
been jealous of the London central office exercising this in Ireland.92 The 
question of patronage and Home Rule was a vexed one.93  Carson claimed that 
patronage was ‘the emblem of sovereignty for which Ireland are so 
enthusiastic’,94 while Lord MacDonnell had claimed that this was mostly of a 
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‘petty and purely local character’.95 William Moore argued it was ‘naked and 
unashamed transaction’, which would see the Post Office ‘packed with all the 
promising recruits from the Ancient Order of Hibernians, the Gaelic League 
and the United Ireland League.’96 As positions in the Post Office did not require 
a skilled education or examination, the ‘password of the Hibernians will be 
enough to get the job’ and all the extremists in the nationalist movement would 
fill the positions and be paid by the British government. Moore argued that 
jobbery was already a feature of the British Post Office, and that the nationalists 
led by Joe Devlin had made ‘a point of getting their nephews, cousins, aunts 
and everybody else jammed into the Post Office at the present time’. He then 
broadened this to a concern about general security: ‘When you have the Post 
Office handed over to these people, what security will there be for those who 
differ with them, those who are in a minority and must, … suffer?97   
While Moore, a Unionist judge who played an active part in 
strengthening Ulster unionist forces by reviving the various Ulster defence 
associations against any attempt to weaken the link with the union,98 was not 
an unbiased commentator, the reference to the Ancient Order of Hibernians 
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(AOH) was not unfounded. It reflected a genuine fear held by Ulster 
Protestants.  The AOH was an oath bound society, which it has been argued, 
was viewed by Ulster unionists as more important than the Irish parliamentary 
party.99 Even Nationalist MPs had serious concerns about the AOH.100 On a 
popular level, such fears were great.  Incidents such as the threatened boycott 
of the post office at Glenfarme in Co. Leitrim over the appointment of a 
protestant postmaster in a district, which was 95% Roman Catholic, led the 
unionist press to ask if that was what was to be expected under Home Rule.101 
            In Tipperary in a meeting at Cahir Castle on Monday 20 May 1912 to 
protest against Home Rule, local Unionists under the Irish Unionist Alliance   
registered their disapproval of the idea of a separate Post Office.102  In 
Coleraine, at a meeting of North Derry Unionists the MP for north 
Londonderry, Hugh Barrie claimed that nationalists were: 
rubbing their hands and gloating about the prospect of bespoiling the 
Philistines; They already had practically full control as the squeezing 
out of protestants had been going on steadily for the last six years. 
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Once you let them be supreme masters of the situation and the notice 
would immediately be posted: No protestant need apply.  
He was convinced that nationalist control of the Post Office would be 
irreparable.103  
The question of the use of the Irish language also elicited great concern 
among unionists. At the committee stage of the bill in October, unionists moved 
an amendment aiming to prevent an Irish parliament making it a requirement 
to have Irish as a qualification for public positions.104  L.S  Amery argued that 
‘every citizen of the UK had as much right to expect as good service in Ireland 
as he gets anywhere else in the UK’ and this included English being spoken in 
post offices in Ireland.105 Duncan Pirie, the Scottish Liberal MP for Aberdeen 
North, labelled the establishment of a separate Post Office a ‘most retrogressive 
step’. He claimed that when in Dublin, he ‘found characters which, if I had not 
known what they were, I should have taken for Greek or Hebrew. [This bill] 
with its fantastic propositions, is driving many Home Rulers away from Home 
Rule’.106  
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 For all the objections made to the transfer of control of the Post Office to 
the Irish government the amendment was lost; but the government majority fell 
from 108 to 79. Concerns about security led to an amendment in committee 
stage that in times of war control of the Post Office would revert to the imperial 
government.107  The unionist press lauded attacks made on the proposal. The 
Belfast Newsletter argued that the debate on the Post Office and financial aspects 
of the Bill, ‘betrayed the secret of the Bill’s iniquities – the surrender of the 
Government to the Nationalists’ demands that make for the assertion of 
national independence’.108 Northern Whig claimed the debate only served to 
‘emphasise the horrible muddle into which the Government has got itself’. It 
argued that the only reason for handing over the Post Office was for patronage 
and the big drop in the majority was an indication of uneasiness among the 
rank and file.109   
The nationalist paper the Freeman’s Journal accused the Unionists of 
histrionics and ‘indulging in the wildest exaggerations’ claiming that if an Irish 
postage stamp meant the disintegration of the Empire they could not have 
‘denounced the symbol of a separate Irish authority with more vehemence.’ 
While Carson was ‘eloquent’, on the economic consequences of nationalism it 
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claimed ‘a ragged nationality’ would at least be ‘respectable and would give 
more promise for the future’.110 The Irish Independent bemoaned the present 
‘extravagant’ ‘unified system’, responsible for the increase in expenditure.111 
 
There was also concern about increasing political activity in the Post 
Office. In August 1912 there was speculation that Belfast postal workers 
intended to mutiny on September 28 and take over the Post Office to show their 
contempt for the present government.   A correspondent for the Manchester 
Guardian argued that ‘no-one acquainted with the local conditions’ could have 
made such a statement as it ‘was common knowledge that the greater 
proportion of men and women employed in the Post Office are Nationalists, 
socialists or adherents of Sinn Féin’. It argued that the unrest which has been 
growing in Belfast was not political but due to genuine grievances of high 
pressure, low pay and alleged favouritism. Any action that would take place 
would do so with fellow workers in Dublin.112 However, the date in question 
was the day on which Ulster Unionists would sign the Solemn League and 
Covenant in protest at Home Rule. Furthermore, the Derry Journal reported that 
plans were afoot by the Provisional Government to replace the King George 
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stamp with one bearing the image of Carson.113 Many postal workers were 
involved in political organisations, and a few were dismissed from service due 
to this.114 Many Post Office officials were in the Gaelic League both in Ireland, 






By December 1913, it was clear that changes to the provisions on the Post Office 
in the bill were afoot.116 By then, Ulster unionist opposition to the bill had 
escalated. In January 1913 the Ulster Volunteer Force was formed. In December 
1913, in a speech to the Reform Club in Manchester, Asquith intimated that he 
would jettison the idea of establishing a separate Post Office under Irish rule. 
Asquith’s speech was in response to one made by Carson which had stipulated 
three main objections to the Home Rule Bill. These were that no settlement 
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would humiliate Ulster; that Ireland should not get any separate/exceptional 
treatment to other parts of the UK; and that there would be no separation.117 
Asquith argued that the bill had no such intentions (of causing separation) and, 
directing his words to ‘our federalist friends’ that the government was willing 
to ‘consider with an open mind, any stipulations in the Bill – I refer to the case 
of the Post Office - which in their view, have a separatist or anti-Federal 
tendency.’118  
Speculation about the possible omission from the Bill of the transfer of the 
Post Office produced an outcry in nationalist circles.  The Irish writer and 
enthusiast Peadar Toner Mac Fhionnlaoich (McGinley) writing under the name 
of Cú Uladh, the Hound of Ulster, called on the Gaelic League to act: 
With the single exception of the National Board the Post Office is the 
deadliest influence in Ireland against the Irish language…Home Rule 
without the Post Office will be treated by us – that is by Irish Ireland 
– as no Home Rule and that any settlement with the Post Office left 
out …[is] no settlement at all.119  
A letter to the Irish Independent decried ‘this great and good bill is having its 
powers so watered down that it suffers by comparison with any of the British 
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self-governing colonies’.120 It argued that England had failed in her 
administration of the Irish postal service, and that taking this over was a 
national imperative for Ireland.121 It accused the government of pandering to 
the Ulster Unionists to avert a possible rebellion.122 
In a bid to placate unionists, in December 1914 Asquith offered Carson a 
vague kind of ‘home rule within home rule’, making many concessions to the 
Unionists. As expected, one of these was the removal of the Post Office from the 
control of the Irish legislature.123 Redmond reluctantly agreed. In Redmond’s 
personal papers, there is an underlining of the amendment declaring the 
withdrawal of the clause providing for a separate Post Office.124 The nationalist 
press made much of the fact that the Nationalist party did not seem to be 
fighting the government on this. A letter to Irish Independent admonished the 
‘silence of the IPP, and others on the matter’ and wondered whether due to its 
deficit, ‘people were indifferent to what becomes of the Post Office’.125 In the 
meantime, Carson rejected the suggestions and this later led to the exclusion of 
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some part of Ulster from the bill, and eventual partition of Ireland. As 
Redmond’s hope of achieving Home Rule was lost, so too was the chance for a 
separate Post Office.     
The overriding objection to the granting of a separate Post Office for 
Ireland was predicated on the belief that it represented a step on the way to 
separation. Conservatives and many Liberals fundamentally believed that 
home rule would never satisfy nationalists’ demands. Unionist MP Walter 
Long claimed nationalists disliked the bill seeing it as a transitory measure on 
the road to separation. The debates on the transferring of control of the Post 
Office to an Irish government reveal the deep concerns about the wider 
implications of granting a legislature to Ireland.  
An all-Ireland settlement to the Home Rule question proved impossible 
in 1914. Ronan Fanning argues that Redmond and the nationalists refused to 
acknowledge this impossibility by the liberal government, which colluded in 
the pretence that it would be passed in the form it was introduced.126 The 
debates and eventual volte face on the Post Office can be seen as part of this, 
nothing but an illusion of a national fancy.  
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Recent work on the Irish revolution has examined the ideological 
justification for targets chosen by the 1916 rebels.127 The long running battle 
between the Gaelic League and the Post Office over the use of Irish in the mail, 
and the desire of nationalists to have control over this institution, gives context 
to the choice of the GPO as a rebel target.   In March 1914, commenting on the 
continued refusal of the Post Office to accept mails in Irish, one of the founding 
members of the Irish Volunteers, The O’Rahilly, argued ‘being evidently 
regarded as a minority too weak for effective resistance they are made 
Outlanders in their own country.’ He noted that packages in French were 
accepted without question whereas Irish speakers were ordered to learn 
English. As to the silence of the press on this, he wrote ‘nobody cared tuppence 
about the rights of a minority unless that minority is organised, armed and 
unscrupulous’.128  States have long made symbolic use of the environment 
through government and public buildings.129 As G.A. Boyd argues the GPO 
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demonstrated British presence from its architectural features to the diurnal 
departures of the mail coach bound for London.  Patrick Pearse, one of the 
leaders of the rebellion, is said to have understood the value of space and a 
physical architectural backdrop for action.130  As a space of power, the GPO in 
Dublin, like post offices throughout the land, was a physical expression of the 
British state in Ireland. After the outbreak of war in 1914, Post Offices 
throughout Ireland displayed recruitment posters and Nationalists were 
arrested for tearing them down throughout the country.131 During the Rising, 
copies of the Proclamation of an Irish Republic were pasted over at least eleven 
recruitment posters while others were torn down.132  
 
The importance of institutions for the building of national character was 
repeatedly expounded by the Gaelic League, which argued ‘deprive a nation of 
its institutions and you deprive it very largely of its national mind, and of the 
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means of giving effect to its national will.’133 Nationalists saw securing control 
of the Post Office, as a step towards realising its national will. A letter to The 
Times during the debate on the third home rule bill, suggested that ‘A peculiar 
postage stamp is a symbol of separateness which must have an alienating effect 
of the rising generation’.134 During the debates in the House of Commons, one 
Conservative MP claimed it would be ‘a source of legitimate pride to a 
Nationalist when…he can lick his own national stamp and put it on his own 
letters’.135 The Irish Worker reminded its readers ‘we want to be recognised as a 
Nation …Did you ever hear of a colony – never mind a nation – which had not 
the right to issue stamps?’136 D. M. Reid has argued that ‘for the colonized, 
postage stamps were one more daily reminder of their humiliation and 
powerlessness’.137 At the time of the Rising the banned Sinn Féin propaganda 
labels were reprinted and used.138  
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Nationalists realised the power of possessing control of the Post Office 
and hence were adamant it be included in their demands for self-government. 
Unionists feared what the loss of this control would do to the safety of empire 
and their livelihoods and their sense of national identity.  Just as the likelihood 
of the Home Rule Act to deliver the Irish a reasonable form of self-government 
and the ownership of an independent Irish post office seemed unlikely in 1916, 
the seizing of the GPO by the rebels to announce the republic was hugely 
emblematic. As a bastion of the British state from which the Union flag flew 
and letters bearing the stamps of the empire were sent, it was an important 
space  to assert ownership of ‘that patriotic emblem’ which had for so long been 
denied them. Far more than being merely symbolic, it was a key assertion of 
identity, power and nation. 
 
 
 
 
 
